Custody model
Seams is non-custodial because hosted infrastructure cannot produce wallet signatures or export wallet keys by itself. Signing requires holder-side participation and the correct server-side material for the selected lane. The request must pass Wallet Session admission, policy, replay, quota, and budget checks.
Email OTP wallets
Today, the hosted wallet server can recover the Email OTP factor key of a wallet that uses Email OTP as its owner method, without the user's device. So the statement above does not cover these wallets yet. Passkey and VoiceID wallets are not affected. A planned change keeps the Email OTP factor key on the user's device. After that change, a new device needs device linking or a recovery code.
Export uses a separate, freshly authorized flow. Ordinary signing uses shares and presignature state. It does not reconstruct the full private key.
Who holds what
| Location | May hold | Must never hold |
|---|---|---|
| App origin | Public wallet ids, request intents, non-secret SDK state. | Holder shares, server shares, PRF outputs, Email OTP secret material, VoiceID templates, root shares. |
| Wallet iframe | Wallet UI state, encrypted IndexedDB records, session markers. | Server root shares, Deriver A/B plaintext, unrelated wallet-origin records. |
| Browser signing workers | Hot holder material, compact lifecycle inputs, operation-local secrets. | Deriver A/B root shares, joined server contribution. |
| Email OTP worker | Email OTP factor-derived secret material and hot signing handles. | Plaintext export output outside the authorized export flow. |
| Router | Public routing metadata, policy decisions, Wallet Session admission, replay state. | Plaintext holder shares, root shares, joined wallet private keys. |
| Deriver A | A-side sealed root share and A-side protocol state. | B-side root share, joined root, joined wallet key. |
| Deriver B | B-side sealed root share and B-side protocol state. | A-side root share, joined root, joined wallet key. |
| SigningWorker | Activated server signing material and one-use presignature state. | Client holder share, exported wallet key, Deriver A/B root custody shares. |
Custody invariants
Tenant derivation roots
R120 gives each tenant an independently randomized server-side derivation root. Deriver A and B each retain only their own encrypted operational share in a role-private D1 store. Each role keeps a separately encrypted managed backup in its own R2 bucket. Router coordinates public lifecycle state and receipts.
These tenant-root shares support derivation ceremonies. Wallet custody seeds, client signing roots, and provisioned holder/SigningWorker signing shares have separate custody paths. Refreshing the tenant-root shares preserves the root and wallet identities. It does not replace a wallet custody seed or rekey a wallet. See tenant-root backups.
Signing and authorization
- Router cannot sign by itself.
- A single Deriver cannot derive the full server contribution by itself.
- SigningWorker cannot export wallet keys.
- App-origin code receives public results. Exported keys stay in the wallet-origin viewer.
- Agents and linked devices receive lane-scoped authority.
- Revocation, expiry, and budget exhaustion are checked before signing work.
Recovery and portability
Users can recover through the auth methods and recovery material configured for their wallet. Export is a sensitive operation with fresh authorization, route policy, and exact lane binding.
R121's tenant-controlled recovery restores the exact logical tenant root into an empty destination with a fresh custody lineage. R122's planned portability moves wallet inventory and signing participants, with explicit identity mapping and cutover. Restoring a tenant root alone does not move wallet records, signing lanes, domains, or permissions. See recovery and portability for availability and artifact boundaries.
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